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SPECIAL PROJECT

Current Issues Regarding the
Americans with Disabilities Act
Introduction
President George Bush, noting that "statistics consistently
demonstrate that disabled people are the poorest, least educated, and
largest minority in America," signed the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA") into law in 1990.1 The ADA prohibits private employers2
3
from discriminating against a "qualified individual with a disability"
4
in employment decisions. The Act defines a disability in one of three
ways: (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities; (2) a record of such an impairment;
or (3) being regarded by others as having such an impairment. 5 The
ADA also prohibits employers from inquiring into an applicant's
disability during the pre-employment stage, and places restrictions on
medical examinations before extending an employment offer. 6 Once
the applicant becomes an employee, the employer still cannot require

1.
Allen Dudley, Rights to Reasonable Accommodation under the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct for "RegardedAs" DisabledIndividuals, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 389, 389 (1999)
(quoting President Bush).
2.
Covered entities of the ADA actually include private employers with 15 or more employees, employment agencies, labor organizations and joint labor-management committees.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2), (5) (1994).
3.
A "qualified individual" is one "who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions" of the job. Id. § 12111(8).
4.
See id. § 12112(a). Employment decisions include not only hiring and firing but also
such areas as promotions, compensation, job assignments and classifications, fringe benefits,
training, and "any other term, condition or privilege of employment." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(i)
(1998).
5.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
6.
See id. § 12112(dX2), (3).
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medical exams unless it can show that the concerns are "job-related
and consistent with business necessity."7
The ADA followed the legislation of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and more specifically, the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973.8
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against individuals
with handicaps by federal contractors, federal agencies, recipients of
federal grants, and participants in federal programs.9 Title I of the
ADA parallels most of the substantive provisions from the
Rehabilitation Act and applies them to private employerslo Thus,
when the ADA was signed in 1990, it became the most comprehensive
piece of disability civil rights legislation ever enacted in America."
Congress noted that the Act would cover more than forty-three million
peoplel2 and would "provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities."13
People with disabilities today are still disproportionately poor.
Fifty-nine percent of disabled Americans live in households with incomes less than $25,000, and the poverty rate for adults with disabilities triples that of the rest of the population. 4 One commentator
argues that inability to gain employment underlies these poverty
problems. 15
Because Congress intended the ADA to cover a wide range of
societal problems with disabled Americans, the legislature used broad
and vague terms throughout the Act. 6 Many interpretive issues now
arise-for example, whether former employees are covered, and
whether a disability should be defined with regard to mitigating
measures and technical advancements. One commentator has noted
7.
Id. § 12112(dX4); see also MARK PARENTI, THREE YEARS OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIESACT: LESSONS FOR EMPLOYERS 2-4 (1995) (providing a general overview of the ADA
and its regulations).
8.
See GARY PHELAN & JANET BOND ARTERTON, DISABmTY DISCRIMINATION IN THE
WOREPLACE

§§

1.02, 1.03 (1997).

9.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1994).
10. See Maureen R. Walsh, What Constitutes a "Disability"under the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct: Should Courts Consider MitigatingMeasures?, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 917,
921(1998).
11. See PHELAN & ARTERTON, supra note 8, § 1.01.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994). This number reached 54 million Americans (one in
five) in 1995, with 26 million (one in ten) reporting a severe level of disability. See Barbara A.
Petrus & Denice von Gnechten, A Primeron the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 2 HAW. BAR J.
6 n.1 (1998).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(b)(1) (1994).
14. See Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National
Employment Policyfor People with Disabilities,46 BUFF. L. REV. 123 (1998).
15. See id.
16. See Walsh, supranote 10, at 918.
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that the term "disability" must be defined under social, not legislative,
standards. 17 For example, in previous times, reading was not
considered an "essential function" and therefore persons with dyslexia
were not disabled. In the future, physical disabilities will become less
important because machines will do most of the physical labor.
Today, however, both physical and mental disabilities make a
qualified job candidate less desirable.' 8 Thus, because of everchanging societal standards and the broad language used in the ADA,
the following three Notes attempt to identify and provide solutions to
three uncertain areas of ADA law.
The first Note discusses the applicability of the ADA to former
employees. 19 Before May 1998, most federal courts interpreted the
"essential functions" requirement of the ADA to bar lawsuits brought
by completely disabled former employees, who by their own admission
are unable to perform essential employment functions. The Second
and Third Circuits, however, recently have held that the "essential
functions" requirement is inconsistent with Congress' stated mandate
to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities.
Thus, these two circuits applied ADA protection to individuals unable
to perform essential job functions. This Note argues that the Second
and Third Circuits found ambiguity in the statute where none existed
and misinterpreted the legislative history of the Act. The Note concludes that the essential functions requirement should not be ignored,
and completely disabled former employees should not be given
protection under the ADA.2o

The ADA is constitutionally analyzed in the second Note of this
Special Project issue. This Note argues that the Seventh Amendment
requires a right to a jury trial in claims brought under the ADA even
when back pay is the only remedy sought. 21 The Seventh Amendment
provides the right to a jury trial in all actions deemed legal rather
than equitable. Parties currently have a statutory right to a jury trial
when a plaintiff seeks compensatory or punitive damages. When the
plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief and back pay, however, the ADA
does not expressly provide a right to a jury trial. District courts have

17. See Weber, supranote 14, at 123.
18. See id.
19. See Austin L. McMullen, Note, Disabled Former Employees Under the ADA.
UnprincipledDecisionsand UnpalatableResults, 52 VAND. L. REV. 769 (1999).
20. See id. at 792-93.
21. See Robert L. Strayer, H, Note, Asserting the Seventh Amendment: An Argument for
the Right to a Jury Trial When Only Back Pay Is Sought Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 52 VANID. L. REV. 795 (1999).
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deferred to Congress's apparent intention not to provide a jury trial in
these cases, and to dicta from Supreme Court cases that characterize
back pay as an equitable remedy under the ADA. This Note argues
that the Supreme Court has never held that back pay is an equitable
remedy and has, to the contrary, held that back pay is a legal remedy
under other statutory schemes. The Note continues by showing that
back pay would be classified as a legal remedy under a two-part test
adopted by the Court to determine whether a remedy is legal or
equitable. The Note concludes by proposing either that Congress
amend the ADA to provide a right to a jury trial for ADA claims asking only for back pay, or that lower courts follow Supreme Court
reasoning and require the right to a jury trial.22
The final Note shows the difficulty of defining "disability" in a
society with rapidly increasing technology.2 Specifically, this Note
examines the issue of pregnancy-related problems and whether these
should be defined as disabilities with regard to mitigating measures
that lessen the effect of the disability. Courts currently tend to
classify pregnancy-related problems as disabilities if the underlying
effect is more than just a pregnancy-related side effect. Courts divide
pregnancies into two categories: normal and abnormal. If the
pregnancy is defined as normal, then any problems resulting will just
be considered side effects. If the pregnancy is abnormal, however, the
woman may seek protection under the ADA. Courts utilizing this
approach uniformly assert that the distinction between normal and
abnormal pregnancies depends on the advancement of medical
knowledge and technology. This Note argues that these courts should
not assess disabilities with regard to mitigating measures. When one
examines the alarming rate of technological advancement in our
society, it becomes increasingly clear that the definition of a disability
should not hinge upon the continuous change of technology. Instead,
the ADA's definition of disability should rely upon more stable
characteristics such as how the disability affects the life of the person
in question. Therefore, the Note argues, mitigating measures should
not be taken into account if technology is not to be the core of the
analysis.4
As these Notes demonstrate, after seven years the ADA still
has many unresolved issues. Unlike other civil rights laws, the ADA
22. See id. at 828-29.
23. See Jessica Lynne Wilson, Note, Technology As a Panacea: Why Pregnancy-Related
Problems Should Be Defined Without Regard to MitigatingMeasures Under the ADA, 52 VAND.
L. REV. 831 (1999).
24. See id. at 867-68.
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must define a "person with a disability" more specifically than the
Civil Rights Act has to define race, religion, or sex. And although the
Civil Rights Act imposes affirmative action programs, the ADA often
requires a more costly burden through its requirement of "reasonable
accommodations." Finally, who is protected under the ADA relates
back to how our society addresses the stereotypes of people with
disabilities. Therefore, the ADA concerns all of us, from the disabled
to employers to society in general. Hopefully these three Notes will
lead to an increased debate over these uncertain issues.
John-PaulMotley
Special Project Editor

